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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
(the "District Court") had jurisdiction over this action under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691e(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 1331 by reason of Plaintiffs claim under
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. % 1691-1691f
("ECOA") and Massachusetts statutes forbidding discrimination in
places of public accommodation, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 92A and
§ 98, and credit, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4. The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has jurisdiction over this appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and F.R.A.P. % 3, 4. This appeal is from a
Final Judgment, entered October 18, 1999, that disposed of all claims
in the case. Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal in the District
Court on November 15, 1999.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did the District Court err in dismissing Plaintiff Lucas Rosa's
complaint for failure to state any claim for which relief can be granted?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case and the Course
ofProceedings Below
This is an action brought pursuant to the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-169 If and Massachusetts statutes
forbidding discrimination in places of public accommodation, Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 92A and § 98, and credit, Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
151 B, § 4, against a bank for refusing to issue and accept a loan
application from a bank customer because of the customer's sex.
On August 27, 1998, Plaintiff Lucas Rosa filed a charge of
discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination ("MCAD") alleging Defendant Park West Bank
engaged in discriminatory conduct in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
272 §§ 92A, 98. (App. 7,1 Plaintiffs Complaint.) On December 1,
1998, the MCAD dismissed the charge at Rosa's request in order for
1. Citations are to specific pages and items in the record appendix. [The record
appendix is on file with the Michigan Journal of Gender & Law.]
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Rosa to file a civil action, thereby exhausting available administrative
remedies. (App. 7, Plaintiffs Complaint.) Rosa filed his Complaint in
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on
April 29, 1999, alleging violations of the ECOA as well as state law
claims pursued at the MCAD. (App. 2, Docket Entry 1, App. 4-10,
Plaintiffs Complaint.) On August 12, 1999, Defendant Park West
Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss. (App. 2, Docket Entry 6, App. 11-12,
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.) A hearing was held on the Motion to
Dismiss before District Judge Frank H. Freedman on October 18,
1999. (App. 2, Docket Entry 10.) Judge Freedman granted Defendant's
motion in a Bench Order entering Final Judgment in the case on
October 18, 1999, finding that Plaintiff failed to state an ECOA claim.
(App. 2, Docket Entries 12, 13, App. 14-16, Bench Order.) Finding no
merit to the only federal claim in the Complaint, he dismissed the
pendant state law claims for want of federal jurisdiction. (App. 15,
Bench Order.) Plaintiff filed his timely Notice of Appeal on November
16, 1999. (App. 3, Docket Entry 14, App. 17, Notice of Appeal.)
B. Statement ofFacts
On July 21, 1998, Plaintiff Lucas Rosa entered Park West Bank to
apply for a loan. (App. 4, Plaintiffs Complaint, 6.) He met with
bank employee Norma Brunelle who asked Rosa to present three pieces
of identification before she would provide him with the application.
(App. 4, Plaintiffs Complaint, I 10.) Rosa produced three pieces of
identification, all of which contained his photograph. (App. 4,
Plaintiffs Complaint, ' 11.) After examining the photo identification,
Ms. Brunelle told Plaintiff Rosa that she would not provide him with a
loan application until he "went home and changed." (App. 4, Plaintiff s
Complaint, 12.) Lucas was then wearing some clothing that could be
considered traditionally female. (App. 4, Plaintiffs Complaint, 1 7.)
Ms. Brunelle told Rosa that he had to be dressed like one of the
identification cards in which his photographic image appeared
traditionally male before she would provide Rosa with a loan
application. (App. 4, Plaintiff s Complaint, 13.) The interview ended
and the Plaintiff left the Defendant Bank having been refused the
service request, i.e. a loan application. (App. 5, Plaintiffs Complaint,
13, 14.) Because Lucas Rosa, a biological male, was dressed in
primarily female clothing, Ms. Brunelle refused to provide him a loan
application and further process an application for credit.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court erred in granting Defendant's motion to
dismiss because Plaintiff states a viable claim of sex discrimination
under the ECOA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f Lucas Rosa proferred two
separate theories of sex discrimination supported by the allegations of
his complaint. For one, he states a claim of sex discrimination by his
allegation that the Defendant Park West Bank discriminated against
him for failing to meet a stereotype of masculinity. In addition, his
claim that Park West Bank treated him differently than it would treat a
similarly situated woman states a separate and distinct, viable claim.
The District" Court fundamentally misconceived the law as
applicable to the Plaintiffs claim by concluding that there may be no
relationship, as a matter of law, between telling a bank customer what to
wear and sex discrimination. It also misapplied Rule 12(b)(6) to the
extent that it resolved any factual questions beyond the allegations of the
Complaint regarding the basis of the Bank's different treatment of the
Plaintiff. Finally, because the District Court incorrectly dismissed the
single federal claim in Plaintiffs Complaint, it improperly dismissed
Plaintiffs pendant state claims for want of federal court jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
I. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Equal Credit Opportunity Act
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits a lender from
discriminating in any aspect of a credit transaction against an applicant
because of the applicant's sex.2 Among other purposes, Congress passed
the ECOA to ensure that "firms engaged in the extension of credit make
that credit equally available to all creditworthy customers without regard to
sex ... ."' The Act was originally passed in 1974 to prohibit
discrimination on the grounds of sex and marital status. It was
amended in 1976 to broaden the scope of its protections to prohibit
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1994).
3. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495 § 502, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521
(1974) (emphasis added).
4. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495 § 502, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521
(1974).
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credit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin
and age as well.5  Congressman Annunzio, who recommended
expanding the coverage of the ECOA in 1975 explained the original
purposes of the Act as ensuring that:
each individual has a right when he applies for credit, to be
evaluated as an individual: to be evaluated on his individual
creditworthiness, rather than based on some generalization or
stereotype .... Bias is not creditworthiness. Impression is not
creditworthiness. An individual's ability and willingness to
repay an extension of credit is creditworthiness. 6
The ECOA parallels the prohibition of Title VII that an employer
may not take adverse action against an employee because of the
employee's sex This Court has instructed courts to follow Tide VII in
their enforcement and interpretation of the ECOA.' Title VII prohibits
(1) disparate treatment where sex discrimination is a motivating factor
in an employer's adverse employment decision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(m),9 and (2) disparate treatment where a plaintiff shows by direct or
indirect evidence that an employer's action more likely than not was
motivated by unlawfil discrimination and that an articulated business
justification for the action is pretext for discrimination. 10 Plaintiffs may
5. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 1976
U.S.C.C.N. (90 Stat. 251) 251.
6. 121 CONG. Rac. 16,740 (1975) (emphasis added).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
8. Mercado-Garcia v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 979 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir. 1992).
9. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, an employer could disclaim any liability by
showing it would have taken the same action absent the impermissible motive. Price-
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989). This standard was modified by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 which now renders a defendant liable for discrimination
upon proof that a forbidden criterion "was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(m). Where an employer proves that it would have taken the same adverse action
against a plaintiff even if it did not consider the forbidden factor, the plaintiff will be
precluded from seeking damages or reinstatement, but may still be entitled to
declaratory relief, certain injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g(2)(B)(i); see aho Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 932 (3d Cit. 1997)
(under the 1991 Act, employer no longer has complete defense to liability, as it did
under Price Waterhouse).
10. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Lipsett v. Univ.
of P.R., 864 F. 2d 881, 899 (1st Cit. 1988). See also Fernandes v. Costa Bros.
Masonry, 199 F.3d 572, 579-80 (1st Cit. 1999) (Tide VII plaintiffs may proceed
under either mixed motive or pretext approach).
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also prove that an employment policy or practice has an adverse impact
on a protected class.1
Accordingly, applicants for credit may state a claim of sex
discrimination under the ECOA according to one or more of these
methods of proof developed by courts in employment discrimination
cases.
B. Standard ofReview
Review of the dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint is de novo.'2 An
appellate court may affirm a lower court's dismissal for failure to state a
claim only if the plaintiff clearly cannot recover on any viable theory. 3
An appellate court must accept the Plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as true
and "indulge every reasonable inference in his favor." 4
Because, as a matter of law, Rosa alleges a set of facts that, if
proven, would permit a reasonable jury to find in his favor on two
separate theories of sex discrimination-(1) impermissible sex
stereotyping and (2) disparate treatment-the District Court erred in
granting Defendant's 12 (b) (6) motion. Where the District Court
improperly dismissed the federal claim, it erred in dismissing the state
law claims for want of federal court jurisdiction.
II. PLAINTIFF HAS STATED A VIABLE CLAIM OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION BASED ON IMPERMISSIBLE
SEX STEREOTYPING
Taking the facts in Rosa's Complaint as true, as the Court must,
loan officer Norma Brunelle reacted to Rosa's appearance because Rosa
is a man, and told Rosa that the reason for her refusal to provide him a
loan application was his failure to meet a stereotype of masculinity. In
other words, in Norma Brunelle's eyes, Lucas Rosa did not look the way
a "real man" should. Because acting on sex stereotypes is impermissible
11. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
12. Cooperman v. Individual Inc., 171 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1999).
13. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (reversing the dismissal of African-
American employees' complaints that sufficiently alleged their union's breach of the
union's duty to fairly represent them without hostile discrimination); Langadinos v.
Am. Airlines Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 2000) (vacating lower court's dismissal
of plaintiffs complaint).
14. Langadinos, 199 F.3d at 69.
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• 15
sex discrimination, and because every applicant for credit has a right to
be "evaluated on his individual creditworthiness, rather than based on
some generalization or stereotype," 16 Rosa states a viable claim.
In Price Waterhouse, the United States Supreme Court determined
as a legal matter that a female associate had been discriminated against
as a matter of law "because she was a woman" where members of her
accounting firm had acted on sex stereotypes in denying her
partnership. 7 The Court affirmed the district court's decision in Ann
Hopkins's favor, holding, inter alia, that the district court properly
determined that sex stereotyping had played a part in Price
Waterhouse's partners' evaluations. According to the Supreme Court,
one of the critical comments evidencing the role that sex stereotyping
had played in the discriminatory process was the comment made by the
partner who ultimately explained to Hopkins the reason for the Policy
Board's decision. Summarizing the reasons for the refusal to make her a
partner, he explained that in order to improve her chances for
partnership she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry." 8 Simply put, Ann Hopkins did not exhibit her femininity in a
way that met the other partners' perceptions of how a "real woman"
should look and act at Price Waterhouse.
This Court has recently affirmed the strength and significance of
the Price Waterhouse analysis. In Higg&ins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe,
Inc.,' 9 this Court reviewed a district court's grant of summary judgment
for an employer in a case in which a former New Balance employee
alleged hostile environment sex discrimination. As this Court
recognized, the record proffered by Higgins made manifest that Higgins
"toiled in a wretchedly hostile environment," but one that Higgins
alleged in the trial court was triggered not by Higgins's sex but by his
sexual orientation.20 Despite its scorn for the co-workers' bad behavior,
this Court held that, as litigated by Higgins, it could not factually find
his action within Title VII because its prohibitions do not stretch that
far, proscribing harassment because of sex, not necessarily of sexual
S • 21
orientation.
15. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
16. 121 CONG. Rrc. 16,740 (1975).
17. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (1989).
18. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
19. 194 F.3d 252, 259 (lst Cir. 1999).
20. Higgins, 194 F.3d at 258, 260.
21. Higgins, 194 F.3d at 259-60.
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Only on appeal did Higgins argue that "he was harassed because he
failed to meet his co-workers' stereotyped standards of masculinity...., 22
Unable to accept Higgins's eleventh hour attempt to present a new
theory of sex discrimination, this Court affirmed the summary
judgment for the defendant. However, this Court made clear that, just
as a woman can ground a claim of sex discrimination on evidence that
she was discriminated against for a failure to meet stereotyped
expectations of femininity,' so too could a man ground a claim on
evidence that he was discriminated against "because he did not meet
stereotyped expectations of masculinity."
24
Taking the facts as Rosa has alleged them, the comparison to Price
Waterhouse and (the sex stereotyping argument this Court endorsed in)
Higgins is striking. In telling Rosa to "go home and change" in order to
look more like a photograph in which he looked stereotypically
masculine, it is reasonable to infer based on the allegations of the
Complaint that the lender told Rosa he would not be given an
application because he failed to meet the bank's "stereotyped standards
of masculinity."25 It is also reasonable to infer based on the allegations
that the bank told Rosa that in order to receive a loan application he
should, just as Hopkins's evaluators had told her in the employment
context, meet the bank's perception of how a "real man" should look
and act when applying for a loan. Thus, Plaintiff has alleged that his
creditworthiness was determined by Park West Bank according to an
"impression" based on some "generalization or stereotype" of
masculinity, rather than his "ability and willingness to repay an
extension of credit."27
Under either reasonable construction of the facts, the lender acted
on sex stereotypes in denying Rosa an application. In other words, in
22. Higgins, 194 F.3d at 259.
23. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 250-5 1.
24. Higgins, 194 F.3d at 261 n.4. See also Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., Inc., 187 F.3d
862, 865 (8th Cit. 1999) (allegations that co-workers harassed employee "to debase
his masculinity" states a Tide VII claim of sex discrimination); EEOC v. Trugreen
Ltd. P'ship, 1999 U.S. Dist. L.XIS 9368, at *23 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 23, 1999)
(plaintiff could succeed on a theory that employer treated employee adversely because
employee "did not exhibit his masculinity in a way that met [employer's] conception
of how a man should behave"); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 1999 WL 754568, at
*6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1999) (facts that an employee was targeted for harassment
because of how "he projected his gender, or how his gender was perceived by co-
workers" supported a claim of sex discrimination).
25. Higgins, 194 F.3d. at 259.
26. Compare Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
27. See 121 CONG. Rc. 16,740 (1975).
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the language of Price Waterhouse, Park West Bank treated Lucas Rosa
adversely because Rosa did not exhibit his masculinity in a way that met
Park West Bank's conception of how a man should look. As the United
States Supreme Court has now long held, "we are beyond the day"
when employers (and banks, by analogy) may insist that employees
(which, as the district court judge noted are the equivalent in this case to
loan applicants, App. 15) "match[ ] the stereotype associated with their
,,28
group.
Although seemingly tautological, it bears mention that sex
stereotyping includes enforcing gendered norms of appearance, that is,
making sure that men look like men and women look like women. As
this Court recently explained, the concept of stereotyping includes a
host of "subtle cognitive phenomena which can skew perceptions and
judgments." 29 Acting on stereotypes based on appearance is squarely
within this construct." This point is underscored by considering that
Merriam Webster defines stereotype as "a standardized mental picture
that is held in common by members of a group and that represents an
over-simplified opinion, affective attitude, or uncritical judgment."3
Nearly every case involving stereotypes focuses in some way on
perceptions based on appearance. The advice given to Ann Hopkins
28. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (citing City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
29. Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 61 (1st Cir. 1999).
30. Social science literature is replete with affirmation that presumptions about
appearance form a central component of stereotyping. See, e.g., Kay Deaux & Laurie
L. Lewis, Structure of Gender Stereotypes: Interrelationships Among Components and
Gender Labe 46 J. PERsoNALIrY & SoC. PsY HoL. 991, 992 (1984). Consider, too,
the conclusions drawn in a study analyzing how people's views of employees were
skewed by perceptions of attractiveness. In their study, Heilman and Stopeck found
that attractive men were viewed as more capable than unattractive ones, whereas
attractive women were viewed as less capable than unattractive ones. Moreover, the
study found a relationship between perceptions of masculinity and competence.
Madeline F. Heilman & Melanie H. Stopeck, Attractiveness and Corporate Success:
Different Causal Attributions fr Males and Females, 70 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 379
(1985). It is hard to imagine a more central component of stereotyping than those
drawn around appearance.
31. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1156 (9th ed. 1986) (emphasis added).
32. In an Eighth Circuit case in which Judge Aldrich sat by designation, that court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects a student's personal
freedom to govern one's appearance. Striking a public high school's sex-specific hair
length regulation, Judge Aldrich commented on the baselessness of stereotypes about
boys with long hair. He commented:
The area of judicial notice is circumscribed, but I cannot help but observe
that the city employee who collects my rubbish has shoulder-length hair.
So do a number of our nationally famous Boston Bruins. Barrel tossing and
2001]
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that she take a course in charm school is an obvious example of this,
along with the counsel that she "dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry," comments the Court
characterized as the "coup de grace." 3 Indeed, dismissing the need for
expert testimony to prove that sex stereotyping had played a role in
Hopkins's case, Justice Brennan commented, it requires no expertise in
psychology to know that if an employee's abilities can be "corrected by a
soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex
and not" her abilities that has drawn criticism!" As one legal
commentator has explained, in Price Waterhouse the Court did not find
as a matter of fact that "Hopkins's appearance was appropriate for her
sex; it held as a matter of law that it constituted sex discrimination for
her employer to require that it be so. " "
For the simple and straightforward reasoning that sex stereotyping
is sex discrimination, plaintiff has set forth a viable claim which survives
a motion to dismiss.
III. PLAINTIFF HAS STATED A VIABLE CLAIM OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON DISPARATE TREATMENT
OF MEN AND WOMEN
Plaintiffs Complaint also states a claim of sex discrimination
because the Defendant bank denied Rosa a loan application when it
would have provided one to a similarly situated woman. Taking the
facts alleged in Rosa's complaint to be true, the loan officer refused to
give Rosa, a biological male, a loan application because he did not
appear stereotypically masculine. It is reasonable to assume that the
Bank would not have refused to provide a loan application to a female
puck chasing are honorable pursuits, not to be associated with effeteness on
the one hand, or aimlessness or indolence on the other. If these activities be
thought not of high intellectual calibre, I turn to the recent successful
candidates for Rhodes Scholarships .... A number of these, according to
their photographs, wear hair that outdoes even the hockey players. It is
proverbial that these young men are chosen not only for their scholastic
attainments, but for their outstanding character and accomplishments....
It is bromidic to say that times change, but perhaps this is a case where
bromide is in order.
Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1077-1078 (8th Cir. 1971) (Aldrich, J.,
concurring).
33. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
34. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256.
35. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and FeministJurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 49 (1995).
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customer dressed in traditionally female clothing. In fact, it is hard to
conceive, based on contemporary fashions that Park West Bank would
deny any woman a loan application because of the gendered nature
(masculine or feminine) of her appearance.
Simply stated, Lucas Rosa was denied the opportunity to apply for
a loan when a similarly situated woman would not have been denied.
This difference in treatment of men and women, in the most elemental
of ways, is what constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.37
Plaintiff can certainly seek to show, based on the allegations in his
complaint, that Park West Bank never declines to provide loan
applications to women regardless of whether their appearance matches
stereotypes of femininity. At the same time, a developed record may
show that the Defendant Park West Bank only permits men who look
stereotypically masculine to apply for credit. At its heart, this states a
claim of disparate treatment.
Even if Park West Bank's clothing requirement simply follows
conventional norms of "appropriate" gender expression, Rosa may show
that it allows a narrower range of permissible gender expression for men
than for women. For example, it is hard to conceive, based on
contemporary fashions that Park West Bank would deny any woman a
loan application because of the gendered appearance of her dress-
whether too masculine or too feminine-proving that there is neither
facial nor formal equality with regard to permissible gender expression
for men and women at Park West Bank. If women customers are not
denied loan applications for their failure to meet a gendered stereotype,
neither should Plaintiff.
Apart from the obviousness of the argument, significant social
science data supports the conclusion that the range of permissible
36. See, e.g., Case, supra note 35, at 22 n.60.
37. See City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
(pension plan that required women to make larger contributions than men violated
Title VII prohibition against sex discrimination); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 366 F.
Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973) (practice of restricting purser jobs at airline to men only
was impermissible sex discrimination under Title VII); Burkey v. Marshall Cty. Bd.
of Ed., 513 F. Supp. 1084 (N.D.W. Va. 1983) (policy of restricting coaching
positions for boys' sports to male teachers constitutes illegal discrimination under
Title VII on the basis of sex). See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996);
Mississippi v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (stereotypical views of men and women
insufficient to justify different treatment in admission to nursing school); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (insufficient justification for different treatment of
sexes); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (same).
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gender expression for men is narrower than it is for women." A relaxing
of gender norms for women, but not for men, has taken place
throughout the workplace, including the legal profession." It would be
unsurprising to be able to show that a similar relaxing of gender norms
for women has taken place in places of public accommodation and as
part of credit transactions. While it might be noted that a different
range of acceptable gender expression for men and women is fairly
ubiquitous, that does not obviate its impermissibility as a legal matter
where a statute squarely forbids sex discrimination.
Because Plaintiff has alleged a difference in treatment of men and
women by the Defendant, Plaintiff has set forth a viable claim adequate
to withstand a motion to dismiss.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT FUNDAMENTALLY MISCONCEIVED
BOTH THE LAW AS APPLICABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
AND THE PROPER APPLICATION OF RULE iz(B)(6)
The District Court's Order incorrectly states that a requirement
that "Rosa change his clothes [can] not give rise to claims of illegal
discrimination." (App. 15, Judge's Order.) This facile distinction
between dress, on the one hand, and unlawful sex discrimination, on the
other, as if, by definition, the two are necessarily separate and unrelated,
is simply wrong both as a matter of law and fact. To the extent the
Court is drawing a legal conclusion that claims grounded in dress
requirements can never state a claim of sex discrimination, its ruling is
simply wrong. Dress requirements have regularly been found to
constitute prohibited sex discrimination. Moreover, this is true even in
the employment context where it is less difficult to justify a sex-specific
dress requirement than it is in the credit context before this Court.40
38. See ELEANOR EMMONS MACOBY AND CAROL NAGY JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SEX DIFFERENCES 284, 328 (1974) (parents much more tolerant of girls who exhibit
"boy-like" behavior than they are of boys who exhibit "girl-like" behavior); Case,
supra note 35, at 2-3; Donald R. McCreary, The Male Role andAvoding Femininity,
31 Sax ROLES 517, 518 (1994).
39. See, e.g., Martin Fox, Bar Panel Tackles Sticky Issue ofAppropriate Garb for Women,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1991, at 1 (the wearing of "tailored pants suits" by women lawyers
determined not to violate the Code of Professional Responsibility).
40. It bears mention that there are no facts in the record to support an inference that
Park West Bank's refusal to provide Rosa a loan application was in any way
connected to enforcing a dress code or appearance requirement. No suggestion that
Park West Bank was acting in conformity with a dress code or appearance
requirement, sex-specific or otherwise, was ever made by the Defendant either at
argument or in the record below. Rosa addresses it here, nevertheless, as the District
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Alternatively, to the exterft the Court is drawing a factual inference
regarding the Bank's motive in telling Rosa to go home and change, i.e.,
that the reason was dress and not sex, it may not do so consistent with
Rule 12(b)(6).
A. The District Court Erred in Holding That a
Requirement That Rosa Change His Clothes to
Conform to Gender Stereotypes Cann't Give Rise to
a Claim ofIllegal Sex Discrimination
Dress codes and sex discrimination are not mutually exclusive
categories. Courts have long recognized that dress requirements may
constitute impermissible sex discrimination in the employment context
for a variety of reasons.
Some courts have struck dress codes or appearance requirements
because they were applied differently for men and women and were not
supported by any permissible justification.4' Others have said that a
discriminatory application of even a sex-neutral dress code evidences
bias.42 Still others have found sex-specific dress code or appearance
requirements discriminatory because they created a special disadvantage
for an employee based on sex.43 Finally, some courts have found sex-
specific dress codes or appearance requirements impermissible because
of the particular hardship that falls on one sex as a result."
Court's Order suggests that it may have been guided by a presumption the bank was
acting consistent with some unarticulated dress requirement.
41. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982)
(Continental's desire to compete by featuring attractive female cabin attendants
insufficient to support discriminatory weight requirement).
42. See, e.g., Tamimi v. Howard Johnson Co., 807 F.2d 1550, 1554 (11th Cit. 1987)
(creation of facially neutral makeup rule evidence of pretext for sex discrimination);
Harding v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 929 F. Supp. 1402, 1406 (D. Kan.
1996) (evidence that a "no tank tops" requirement only applied to female employee
could support inference of sex discrimination).
43. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan, 604 F.2d 1028, 1030 (7th Cit. 1979)
(striking dress code that required women to wear a uniform but allowing men to wear
business suits); O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp.
263, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (dress code requiring female sales clerks to wear "smock"
while allowing male sales clerks to wear shirt and tie impermissible, even absent
discriminatory motive, because it perpetuated sex stereotypes).
44. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(sexually provocative uniform requirement impermissible); Marentette v. Michigan
Host Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909, 912 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (sexually provocative dress code
unreasonable).
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In short, invocation of a "dress code" defense (should Defendant
ever make one) does not immunize Park West Bank's conduct from the
structure of Tide VII. Moreover, even in those cases where courts have
upheld even sex-specific dress codes, they have done so because the dress
or appearance requirement, though sex discriminatory, can be justified
by business justifications reasonably related to the job." Even assuming,
arguendo, that an employer might be able to justify a dress code
according to business needs in the employment context, there can be no
plausible justification for basing creditworthiness determinations upon a
person's gendered appearance. Indeed, this is -the precise evil that the
ECOA was designed to address.
There is no relationship between creditworthiness and appearance.
Sex stereotypical appearance bears no relationship to creditworthiness.
Therefore, a requirement that Rosa appear in a sex stereotypical fashion
before he can receive a loan application fits squarely within
discriminatory conduct prohibited by the ECOA."6
B. The District Court Erred to the Extent It Resolved
Questions of Fact About the Bank's Reasons for
Refising to Provide Rosa With a Loan Application
In circumventing Rosa's straightforward sex discrimination claim,
the District Court's Order attempts either to dissociate dress from sex
(see Section IVA., above) or to remove the Plaintiffs sex from the
Defendant's basis for its action. In the words of the District Court, "the
issue in this case is not [Plaintiffs] sex, but rather how he chose to dress
when applying for a loan." (App. 14, Judge's Order.) In short, the
Order makes a factual determination that Lucas Rosa's case merely
involved the Bank's telling him what to wear and nothing more. This is
only possible by looking past the allegations of the Complaint and
improperly resolving the factual question of whether sex was a factor
behind the lender's decision not to provide Rosa with a loan
application-e.g. whether the appearance requirement was a sex-based
one.
Regardless of whether the court ultimately credits the allegation
that sex was a motivating factor, (App. 6, Plaintiffs Complaint 20),
45. See Carroll 604 F.2d at 1033 (some courts have permissibly upheld sex-specific dress
codes where reasonably related to "employer's business needs.").
46. Pub. L. No. 93-495 § 502, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521 (1974) (one of the purposes of the
ECOA was to ensure that credit would be available to all creditworthy customers
without regard to sex).
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the appellant's complaint states a claim. The District Court's Order
improperly rejected Rosa's characterization of the Bank's reason for
denying him a loan application, a logical factual inference to be drawn
from the allegation that the loan officer refused to provide him a loan
application until he "went home and changed" to appear more
traditionally masculine. (App. 5, Plaintiffs Complaint 'l 12, 13.)
While it will certainly be the province of the factfinder (later on) to
decide if Rosa can sufficiently support his allegations, it would be
improper on a motion to dismiss to discredit a properly plead allegation
of the reason for the Bank's refusal.4
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE STATE
LAw CLAIMS FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION
The only ground for dismissing the state law claims, according to
the District Court's Bench Order, (App. 15, Judge's Order), was "for
want of jurisdiction" where the court dismissed the only federal
question in the case. Once it is clear that the federal claim properly
survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, (see Sections II, III, and IV,
above) the District Court's justification for dismissing the state law
claims dissolves. Accordingly, because the District Court improperly
dismissed the ECOA claim, it improperly dismissed the state law claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should determine that Lucas
Rosa has stated a valid claim under the ECOA, vacate the District
Court order dismissing the claim, reinstate the ECOA and state law
claims and remand for further proceedings.
Date: 1/28/00
47. See Moore v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 993 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1993)
(plaintiff stated a race discrimination claim where FMHA refused to process requests
from white applicants regardless of what facts might be later shown regarding
qualifications or effect of discrimination).
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